Structures of Cooperation & Conflict: Local Forces in Mandatory Palestine during the Second World War

From the recruitment of Roger’s Rangers in the Seven Years’ War to the Sunni Awakening, the employment of local forces is a persistent theme throughout the history of warfare. Although at times individual local forces have received narrative attention, there has as yet been no comprehensive study of the nature, structure, function, or experience of these forces. One way these forces differ from institutional forces is their temporary and sometimes ad hoc nature – they are recruited by metropolitan powers in response to a specific emergency, sometimes as a supplement to conventional forces or out of a desire to intervene militarily without committing to large deployments. These forces are by definition paramilitary in their nature, as, for the most part, are their activities. They are not regular police, gendarme, or military forces. Instead, they represent a subset of a broader category of force that includes paramilitaries, unconventional forces, guerrillas, some militias, and auxiliaries. In the last several decades, the establishment of, and cooperation with, such forces tends to belong neither to the main body of conventional forces nor to intelligence agencies, but to the specific sections responsible for special operations or paramilitary activities. Irregular local forces have formed part of crisis response in imperial security and proxy warfare the world over and have thus played a central role in conflicts. This is clearly shown in the case of the Palestine Mandate during the era of the Second World War.

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This paper explores the structure of the relationship between the British imperial authorities in Palestine and the primary local force with whom they cooperated, the Haganah. In Mandatory Palestine, the relationship structures served both the long-term and immediate interests of the Haganah and the immediate interests of the imperial authorities, and maximized the ability of the local force to contribute to regional defence. Only by the objections of those imperial authorities concerned with the long-term status of governance in Palestine and the intermittent need to project an image of control over, or disassociation from, the local forces curbed this function.

Beyond their non-conventional nature and their difference from regular police and military forces, the single factor that unites the broad categories of irregular forces and auxiliaries, including those local forces that operated in Palestine Mandate, is their relation to irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is at best a nebulous and murky concept, and in recent years the problems of defining it have only become more difficult. There seems to be an organizational tendency to define irregular warfare as everything in which most conventional military forces prefer not to engage. This tendency has led to a conflation of the concepts of irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, population-centric warfare, guerrilla warfare, and small wars. The situation is made more complicated by the hybrid nature of many wars, including the Second World War. As Michael Horowitz and Dan Shalmon noted in their article on the future of war, ‘major state-to-state wars nearly always include irregular elements and phases’.2 This has, in part, led some scholars to suggest that there is no such thing as irregular warfare or that irregular warfare is regular and conventional warfare is irregular.3 Nevertheless, a distinct subject area remains, albeit somewhat buried within the variety of definitions.

One factor that contributes to the elusiveness of a definition is the lack of historical study of irregular warfare and irregular forces. Many scholars, including Frank Hoffman and Barak

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Salmoni from the US Marine Corps, have noted this scarcity of research on irregular warfare and therefore irregular forces, including local forces.\textsuperscript{4} This study, which consists of an examination of the structural dynamics of the relationship with one set of irregular forces, is part of the effort to address this scarcity. Although cooperation between the Haganah and the British Empire existed in many spheres, including intelligence, civil administration, and conventional military recruitment, the areas that concern this study, are solely those related to irregular forces.

As external threats to Palestine manifested during the war, the imperial authorities built and reinforced co-operative arrangements with the Zionist underground in Palestine in general and with the primary paramilitary of the Jewish Agency, known as the Haganah, in particular.\textsuperscript{5} This cooperation was integral to maintaining quiet in Palestine and functioned to such an extent that when other Zionist paramilitaries, such as the Irgun Zvai Le’umi (IZL), took arms against the Empire in 1944, the Haganah effectively suppressed them.\textsuperscript{6} This paper addresses the evolution and nature of the security and military relationship between the British Empire and the Haganah throughout the Second World War by examining the relationship’s structure as it related to irregular force cooperation.

In Palestine, as elsewhere, the structure of the relationship between imperial and local actors strongly influenced the nature and operation of local forces. The structure of any relationship consists of the physical and organizational pathways through which the intentions of those involved in relationships become reality – the required bridge between thought and action. Relationship structure incorporates the processes through which actors make decisions and take action, as well as the process by which the allocation of personnel, information exchange, and resource transfer takes place. In short, relationship structure is the actualization of the relationship. Structure also refers to the level of integration between any two given actors. It thus

\textsuperscript{6} Interview with Yehuda Lapidot.
determines much of what the actors involved in a relationship are able to accomplish and the means through which they can act.

It would be incorrect to identify a single relationship or relationship structure between the Empire and local forces. It is more accurate to speak of multiple evolving relationships and, consequently, multiple overlapping – and at times contradictory – relationship structures. Each imperial actor, such as the Palestine Government or the military administration, maintained a separate relationship with the Haganah. At times, the various imperial organizations went to great lengths to hide from each other the fact and nature of their cooperation with the Haganah. Thus, in their formation and structure, the various relationships had little reference to each other.

Although many imperial and Allied organizations in Palestine and throughout the Middle East had relationships with the Haganah, this paper focuses only on those who employed the Haganah in a primary role in the Palestine area. These included the Palestine Government and the imperial forces which are called the British Army, as well as what will be collectively referred to as the Special Services: Section D, Military Intelligence (Research) (abbreviated as MI(R)), Special Operations Executive (SOE was formed after a merger between MI(R) and Section D) and Political Warfare Executive.

The key imperial-Zionist relationships that defined the constitution and use of local forces in the Levant were those between the Special Services and the Jewish Agency, the Palestine Government/Palestine Police Force (PPF) and the Haganah, and the British Army and the Haganah. These relationships evolved throughout the war and, consequently, were in a constant state of flux. As relationships among the imperial actors changed, their relationships with the Haganah became tangled. This was particularly the case with the relationships between and

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within the Palestine Government, the British Army, and the Haganah. Additionally, during periods of emergency, auxiliary members of the PPF appeared to assume roles of both soldiers and auxiliaries of various regiments of the British Army. The line between the Special Services-Haganah relationship and that of the British Army and the Haganah was sometimes similarly blurred.

Methodology

To date, there has been insufficient examination of this subject. Many good histories of the Palestine Mandate such as Naomi Shepherd’s *Ploughing the Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917-1948*, Norman and Helen Bentwich’s *Mandate Memories: 1914-1948*, and Christopher Sykes’ *Cross Roads to Israel: Palestine from Balfour to Bevin*, pay scant attention to irregular forces. General Middle East histories tend to overlook them entirely. Although several sources cover the Middle East during the Second World War, few deal with its military aspects and fewer with paramilitary aspects. All of the various official British and Indian military histories of the campaigns in the Middle East, while naturally concentrating on the military aspects, all but ignore the existence of any local population. Additionally, there are sources which examine security arrangements in Palestine, including *A Job Well Done: Being a History of the Palestine Police Force, 1920-1948* by Edward Horne, *Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century* by James Lunt, and ‘Securing Palestine? Policing in British Palestine, 1917-39’ by John Knight, but on the whole these too concentrate on regular, uniformed, conventional forces.

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8 Dayan, *Story of my Life*, p. 25; interview with Hayim Kravi.
Several scholars have covered transnational military recruitment and imperial security. However, the focus has remained on regular security and military organization, rather than the irregular forces covered in this study. The studies on conventional imperial security and transnational conventional military recruitment are epitomized by the works of David Killingray, John Darwin, Ashley Jackson, David Omissi, Rob Johnson, and Nir Arielli, among others. In particular, David Killingray and David Omissi’s edited volume *Guardians of Empire* stands out in its examination of conventional military and security organizations in the imperial context.\(^{11}\) In all of these works, the role and reality of irregular local forces still requires examination and attention. This study begins that process.

Given the role of the special services in the relationship with the local forces in Palestine, it might be expected that histories of the special services would be more relevant. However, even M. R. D. Foot’s detailed histories of SOE give this cooperation only the briefest mention. Some works, including *Ha’Haganah* by the Chief Education Officer of the Israel Defence Forces, mention the cooperation in terms of the histories of the Haganah and IZL.\(^{12}\) These provide general outlines of the activities of one side of the cooperation, but either lack focus on the Second World War period or do not focus on the relations between the various parties, as these are not relevant to their overall narrative.

Several excellent works deal with Haganah-British cooperation in a more conventional military, intelligence, and security sense, but not in the realm of irregular warfare. Clive Jones’ article ‘Good Friends in Low Places: The British Secret Intelligence Service and the Jewish Agency, 1939-45’ provides a good survey of the dynamics of the relationship between the Haganah and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) but, given his subject, he naturally pays only cursory attention to the irregular force aspects of cooperation. This is to some extent because, as Jones

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himself states, ‘despite having an intelligence function, the primary role of the SOE was sabotage and subversion’, and is therefore outside of the brief of his article.\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, much of the focus and strength of the article is its emphasis on the political aspects of the relationship, less on the operational level. Where the article considers the operational level, it is primarily in the case of cooperation in the European theatre of operations, not the Middle East.

Yoav Gelber has produced numerous works on Mandatory Palestine during the Second World War period. Perhaps the most significant for this study are those related to the book \textit{Massada - The Defense of Palestine in the Second World War}, published in Hebrew in 1990.\textsuperscript{14} These include ‘The Defense of Palestine in World War II’, published in \textit{Studies in Zionism} in 1987, and his four-volume history of \textit{Jewish Palestinian Volunteering in the British Army during the Second World War}.\textsuperscript{15} Gelber’s works, while significant for understanding the background and broader themes of security and defence in Mandatory Palestine during the war, have some limitations in terms of this study. While Gelber notes the irregular force cooperation that existed, his primary focus is conventional military cooperation and recruitment. Additionally, in his work on the defence of Palestine, his focus stays firmly on the strategic level, political relations, and what in contemporary parlance would be termed concept of operations. The ongoing process of declassification also limited the scope of Gelber’s work. Many operational documents and files relevant to irregular forces and special operations in the Palestine Mandate underwent declassification since the publication of Gelber’s work. Given the conventional military and intelligence focuses of both Yoav Gelber and Clive Jones’ work, a gap remains when it comes to considering the operational level in general and irregular forces in particular.


\textsuperscript{14} Yoav Gelber, \textit{Massada - The Defense of Palestine in the Second World War} (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1990)

To compensate for the lack of sources covering the operational level of cooperation and irregular forces, this paper employs a mixed methodology including a thorough literature review, archival research, and oral history. The archival research was undertaken in several archives around the United Kingdom, such as the National Archives at Kew Gardens, and several archives in Israel, including the Archives of the Haganah in Tel Aviv as well as local archives across the area. The use of a diversity of archival and secondary literature as well as interviews maximized the possibility of cross verification and exposing neglected aspects of the campaigns and cooperation.

Although this study does shed light on the dynamics of the security and military history of Palestine Mandate, it primarily explores the operational level relationship dynamics as an example of irregular force cooperation. As such, it better belongs to a literature that has yet to emerge, a literature that examines military cooperation between local irregular forces, including paramilitaries and metropolitan forces. As this is a still developing field, there is not yet a theoretical literature dealing with the employment of such irregular indigenous forces. This lack of a theoretical framework provided much of the impetus for the larger project of which this study forms a part, the eventual goal of which is to develop a theoretical literature on irregular local forces. Such a literature will not only fill in the gaps in the regional and military histories, but will also exist in conversation with the historical and theoretical literature on empires in conflict and transnational mobilization. It will thus complement the studies that already exist and augment regionally based works, such as those of Clive Jones and Yoav Gelber.

The lack of literature on this subject, and especially on this case, is to some extent understandable because of the difficulties involved in obtaining trustworthy sources. Many documents employed in this examination only recently underwent declassification, and much is

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still unavailable. Additionally, the secrecy and organizational complexity of the Special Services means that many events, decisions, and discussions went unrecorded, and many records were lost, misplaced, or not logically filed.\(^7\) There are significant and particular difficulties regarding documentary evidence in the Middle East, where the Empire guaranteed that it would not reveal the cooperation of certain groups. Moreover, the organizational culture in the Special Services seemed to discourage the maintenance of detailed records.\(^8\) At various times, officers received orders to ‘destroy all incriminating documents’, meaning that many documents and details were lost forever.\(^9\) Finally, even where documents exist there is a question as to their veracity. The politics of special operations and internecine bureaucratic warfare within the special operations and intelligence community were such that, according to Leo Marks, a senior SOE official, ‘people in SOE […] had wilfully misled’ the war diary, which indicates a general willingness to write obfuscatory and official documents and reports.\(^10\) This renders it necessary to handle any official documents with care and a healthy dose of scepticism unless confirmed, at least in principle, by other external sources.

To counteract some of these weaknesses, this paper also examines sources from archives located throughout Israel, which contain documents from the perspective of the Jewish Agency and the Haganah. These sources are also potentially biased, but they add another point of reference, allowing for greater corroboration. The paper augments these sources by using an oral history methodology, which allows new perspectives and access to information on those aspects of the cooperation unobserved by official British sources.

Oral history is, of course, an imperfect medium and there are problems concerning memory. The methods employed to counteract these issues are those recommended for the critical analysis of


\(^{18}\) Note From: AW/100 To: RWW 19 Sept 1945 on SOE History in HS7/86, UK National Archives – Kew (UKNA).

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

any source, written or oral: independent cross corroboration as verification and close critical analysis. The interview process was designed to expose memory-based discrepancies. All the interviewees cited were interviewed in person and were located through the establishment of contact with extant social and veterans networks, as well as through the cooperation of several archives and historical organizations. There were no translators or third parties involved in conducting the interviews, which were digitally recorded and stored in a secure digital format. The interviews themselves employed both a narrative and interrogative method of questioning, with significant questions repeated in several different forms to expose discrepancies. In many ways, oral history is superior to the verification available to the researcher engaging solely with official sources, as there are few ways to determine whether official reports suffer from lapses in memory or intentional obfuscation on the part of their authors. Fundamentally, this paper takes nothing essential to the analysis as given or stipulated, whether from an oral or documentary source, without independent substantiating corroboration.

**Haganah-Palestine Government Cooperation**

The most durable cooperation between the forces of the Zionist underground and the British Empire was that involving the Palestine Government; tens of thousands of underground members were either directly involved in this cooperation or received training because of it. This relationship ostensibly commenced in 1936, with the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, and continued briefly beyond the cessation of the Second World War.

The Arab Revolt of 1936-9 increasingly forced the Mandate to rely on the Yishuv to augment security capabilities. One of the deficiencies of the garrison in Palestine was its lack of familiarity with local terrain and customs. In an attempt to counter this, the authorities of the British Mandate and military created a structure to work with indigenous forces. In this structure, which can be termed the ‘guides scheme’, recruitment and deployment occurred on an individual
basis. The Yishuv ‘guides’ enjoyed full integration into British regiments, serving in regimental uniform, living with the regiment, and were apparently subject solely to the regiment’s command structure. However, when the unit redeployed elsewhere, the ‘guide’ would remain and integrate into the next unit to arrive. This created a fully organic structure where a guide would stay with the same battalion until it cycled out of Palestine. Beyond this structure, there is evidence that the guides were able to use their status as members of the Haganah to call on Haganah reinforcements for the battalions with whom they served.

The Palestine Government seems to have deemed the guides scheme such a success that, by the end of 1936, it matured into the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP) and Notrim/Ghaffirs scheme. In a practical sense, there was no real difference between the Notrim/Ghaffirs and the JSP. While the JSP existed to patrol settlements and their immediate environs, the Notrim consisted of mobile forces primarily tasked with infrastructure protection. However, the names were largely interchangeable. Members of both had PPF ranks and regular uniforms provided by the Palestine Government. The Haganah and the PPF instructed their training. During this period, the JSP and Notrim had structures to suit these two key stakeholders. Individuals joined the JSP through the Jewish Agency, generally under the encouragement of a Haganah (or in some cases IZL) officer. This arrangement removed much of the weight and expense of the JSP/Notrim from the Palestine Government whilst the Haganah was able to control recruitment, benefiting from the training and arming of much of its own membership. Furthermore, whilst operating within the command structure, the JSP and Notrim maintained a high degree of autonomy, which allowed them to take part in large-scale Haganah operations.

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon.
27 Ibid.
28 Interview with Oreon Yoseph.
some of which had objectives concurrent with those of the Palestine Government. This allowed the Palestine Government to make use of the Haganah’s resources while providing legitimate cover to armed Haganah cadres. Moreover, as the Palestine Government and the Haganah often had corresponding objectives during this period, this structure allowed them to cooperate while remaining officially distinct.

One more structure of imperial-Zionist cooperation appeared during the Arab Revolt. Best termed a structure of alliance, its basis was direct cooperation and joint operations. The most prominent example of the functioning of this structure was joint operations concerning the construction of a permanent barrier across the Lebanese border. The Haganah brought Jewish workers to the locations, constructed and guarded camps for the workers, and patrolled some of the area. They received augmentation and support from several British detachments. Each partner operated under an independent command structure and within its own logistics network. However, they functioned towards a common objective. This structure returned in a modified form towards the end of the Second World War.

By 1939, the mood of the Palestine Government and the British Army had changed; both now, at least publically, regarded the anti-Zionist provisions of the 1939 White Paper as necessary for internal stability in Palestine. As such, they were no longer comfortable with the Haganah’s level of integration within its security services and were apprehensive of the Zionist paramilitaries’ growing power and efficacy. Moreover, the emergency of the Arab Revolt had come to an end. Given the new anti-Zionist mood and policies of the Palestine Government, its leadership did not want to appear to have extensive cooperation with the Zionist undergrounds. From this point forward, this was, in general, the Palestine Government’s opinion regarding any cooperation with the forces of the Yishuv.

29 Dayan, Story of my Life, p. 27.
During the Second World War, despite the Palestine Government’s unease, the structure of its relationship with the Haganah was in many ways a continuation and reaffirmation of pre-war structures. As war approached, the JSP’s strength and structure increasingly unnerved the Palestine Government. Due to the transfer of forces to Europe throughout 1938 and 1939, the JSP gradually became responsible for many additional military functions on most British bases and critical infrastructure facilities, such as oil pipelines or major roads.\[^{32}\] The JSP/Notrim grew in strength to around 19,000, a number that independent Haganah formations could reinforce.\[^{33}\] Although the JSP remained officially weaker than the PPF, the PPF’s Criminal Intelligence Division (CID) became nervous of the jointly structured organization.\[^{34}\] With the outbreak of war, one of the major features of security policy in Palestine became the disarming of forces participating in the structures of cooperation.\[^{35}\] This shift in policy would have a lasting impact on structures created during the war – the Haganah became insistent that the design of any structure of cooperation created within Mandate territory should preserve the Haganah’s security against British intelligence and arms seizures.

France fell to Germany in June 1940 and many of its colonies, including Lebanon and Syria, came under Vichy control.\[^{36}\] This brought the war close to the Mandate and began to change the Palestine Government’s behaviour regarding cooperation with the Yishuv. One of the first issues addressed by increased cooperation with Yishuv forces was the possibility of German and Italian submarines and aircraft reaching Palestine, a threat that demanded the creation of forces to watch for signs of their approach.\[^{37}\] To fulfil this vital function, the Palestine Government raised two local forces: the Coast Watch and the Air Watch. The forces, consisting of small units deployed throughout the territory, were primarily drawn from the reserve force of the Haganah,

\[^{32}\] Interview with Hayim Kravi.  
\[^{34}\] CID Intelligence Summary No 19/39 17\(^{th}\) March 1939, p. 4 in File 47/78, AHTA.  
\[^{35}\] G Intel Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940 in WO 169/148, UKNA.  
\[^{37}\] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay.
but were commanded by British officers.\textsuperscript{38} For the Palestine Government, this was a comfortable reliance on local forces; watchmen received rifles but were given minimal combat training.\textsuperscript{39} 

As the military situation in Palestine became more precarious throughout 1940, the Palestine Government returned to augmenting its defence capacity through the JSP/Notrim. In late 1939 and early 1940, the Palestine Government had steadily scaled back the programme, but by late 1940, the JSP was expanding again. Its training was increasingly paramilitary, though at this point focused on the use of rifles and other small arms.\textsuperscript{40} Its membership was still recruited primarily from the Haganah. In fact, the Haganah oversaw most of its structure, including much of the training and command decision making and some logistics.\textsuperscript{41} Oreon Yoseph, who joined the JSP in 1940 and served until late 1941, recalled that the British provided the drill and field training but the Haganah directly provided all other training.\textsuperscript{42} Furthermore, at this stage JSP members reportedly received their deployment orders and postings from the Haganah.\textsuperscript{43} At the very least, recruits joined the JSP/Notrim not through any Palestine Government or imperial authority, but through the local office of the Jewish Agency or on the recommendation of a Haganah officer.\textsuperscript{44} It therefore appears that, by 1940, the JSP’s structure was such that the Haganah actually ran the organization while it was officially under British authority.

This form of delegation by the imperial authorities increased when invasion of Palestine appeared imminent in 1941-2. In 1941, Palestine was on the front line of the war, prompting a change in the Palestine Government’s policy towards locally raised forces from the Yishuv. Expansion of the JSP continued under Haganah leadership and the government employed the

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Oreon Yoseph.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
JSP to guard strategic locations in order to free up combat soldiers for other functions. The structure remained roughly the same; the Palestine Government was nominally in control, while real operational power lay with the Haganah. The Palestine Government was at best unhappy with the structure of its relationship with the JSP and was most reluctant to give it additional capabilities. This was partially because, as the Palestine Government later noted, it was aware that much of the JSP came from the Haganah, which the Palestine Government deemed ‘a menace to security since there can be no guarantee that under the stress of politics, they will not be used against us’. The invasion scare of 1941 also led to the creation of a home guard in Palestine modelled on the one operating in Britain. This organization was especially popular with the urban Jewish community of Tel Aviv, which was underrepresented in the largely rural JSP. In structural terms, the home guard was virtually identical to its British cousin, with one main difference: it seems to have had dual allegiances to the military commander and High Commissioner of Palestine. This unusual civil-military allegiance is representative of many problems inherent in the structure of the relationships between local forces and the Empire in Palestine. Unlike in Britain, there was no unity between the government and the military administration in Palestine. The two groups did not necessarily share the same exclusive focus on winning the war. This was at least partially because the Palestine Government tried to preserve as much of its control as possible over all aspects of power in Palestine, a tendency which reflected its concern over the future of the mandate. Sometimes, as in the case of the home guard, this effort risked muddling operational structures.

46 Cypher Telegram from HC Palestine to Secretary of State for Colonies in CO733/448/15, UKNA.
47 Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police in CO968/39/5, UKNA.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Jones, p. 413.
The gravest threat to Palestine was Rommel’s advance to the borders of Egypt in 1942. Under these circumstances, the Palestine Government was willing to surrender power. One of the most profound changes to the structure of all security forces, indigenous or otherwise, in Palestine in 1942 was the cessation of allegiance to civil authority; all PPF and associated auxiliaries came under military authority.\textsuperscript{51} The PPF and JSP officially became military organizations with police functions rather than police organizations with paramilitary functions.

There is enough evidence from this period and from early 1943 to provide a detailed understanding of the internal structure of the JSP/Notrim and the structure of the cooperative relationship between the Haganah and Palestine Government which it epitomized. The recruitment and deployment of Yitzhak Verdanon, a Haganah member who joined the JSP during this period, seems indicative of the common pattern. Verdanon approached a Haganah manpower officer and indicated his desire to enter uniformed service, but not the British Army.\textsuperscript{52} The officer placed him in the JSP and sent him to a Haganah-JSP liaison officer; the liaison officer took him to a PPF post and told the British NCO that Verdanon was to be in the JSP at Kefar Giladi (a kibbutz on the Lebanese border) and to ‘enlist him as a pickup truck driver, give him a number, permission and everything’. That is exactly what happened.\textsuperscript{53} This anecdote is typical of the path many recruits took into the JSP. It also demonstrates the absolute integration of the structures of the JSP and Haganah. In terms of recruitment and manpower allocation, it is difficult to see where the Haganah ended and the JSP began. In many ways, this structure was beneficial to both the Haganah and the Palestine Government, allowing the Haganah to control its resource allocation and maintain effective control of the JSP while saving the Palestine Government the effort and expense of the recruitment.

\textsuperscript{51} Horne, \textit{A Job Well Done}, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
The JSP/Notrim were organized regional battalions spread across the territory.\textsuperscript{54} Within each battalion, individual units were widely dispersed. In 12\textsuperscript{th} Battalion (Northern Palestine), for example, every kibbutz or Jewish settlement had a garrison of roughly 3-5 JSP, with mobile patrols of Notrim operating from larger bases and police stations.\textsuperscript{55} This dispersal allowed for a remote command structure; each company had a British commanding officer of the rank of captain and a deputy commander of the rank of lieutenant, often stationed dozens of kilometres from the operational posts.\textsuperscript{56} Haganah officers filled all subordinate positions.\textsuperscript{57} The JSP members interviewed in the course of this research all indicated that their only contact with imperial command came during training and on payday; the rest of the time, they operated solely under the authority of the Haganah.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, on those occasions when instructions came through the imperial chain of command, JSP units would not act on them until they received approval from the Haganah.\textsuperscript{59} The British commanders of the JSP apparently knew this to be the case.\textsuperscript{60} Nevertheless, there was nominal official oversight in the form of a logbook at every JSP or Notrim post, which recorded all movements and patrols of personnel, as well as any removal of weapons from armouries and their return.\textsuperscript{61} However, these records, often amended to cover up activities outside official sanction, are at best of dubious accuracy.\textsuperscript{62} Furthermore, the JSP did not always require the weapons in the armouries as they had some access to Haganah weapon stockpiles, which allowed them to carry out operations off the record and augment their firepower in government sanctioned operations.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{54} Mentioned in most interviews of JSP members.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Avraham Rabinov.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Mentioned in most interviews of JSP members.
The training and logistics structure of the JSP involved closer cooperation between the imperial authorities and the Haganah. For example, the JSP, who were part of the imperial structure, and the Haganah in the Galilee region shared a primary base and regional headquarters at Ayelet HaShachar. Training was also a joint enterprise; as was the case in Ein Hashofet, where there was a joint training course. The British knew it as the Corporals’ Course and the Haganah as the Squad Commanders’ Course. The instructors on the course came from the ranks of both the Haganah and imperial forces. This clearly demonstrates that, despite any official statements or protestations to the contrary, the relationship between the Palestine Government and the Haganah was close where the JSP were concerned, built upon a structure of mutual benefit and coordination.

One further form of cooperation existed between the Palestine Government and the Haganah during the period known as the *saison de chasse* (hunting season). In 1944, the IZL withdrew from its truce with the Palestine Government, declaring open rebellion. Due to the Jewish Agency’s desire to support the war effort and cooperate with the government in London, in the autumn of 1944, the Haganah received orders to assist the Palestine Government in the suppression of this rebellion. It has proven difficult to pin down the complete structure of the relationship, given the available time and resources for this body of research, but local cooperation with the British seems to have taken place at a high level; it seems that direct coordination between British and Haganah operational units was rare. The structures of cooperation were such that this was not a simple case of the Haganah acting either as a local auxiliary or as a pseudo gang working at the behest of an imperial master; rather, one might argue that at times the structures were such that the imperial forces were to some extent subordinate to the Haganah.

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64 Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon.
65 Interview with Avraham Rabinov.
66 Ibid.
67 Report by CID (undated) in File 47/20, AHTA.
68 Interview with Hayim Miller.
An incident related by Hayim Miller, an officer in one of the Haganah intelligence units, best illustrates the structural arrangements of the saison. According to Miller, a suspect was located at a cinema in Tel Aviv, at which point Miller contacted Ephraim Dekel, a senior Haganah intelligence officer who was his commanding officer. Imperial forces quickly surrounded the cinema and began detaining all patrons who matched the description Miller had given Dekel. This case demonstrates the regular operating structure of the cooperation. The Haganah provided forces to augment British capabilities, but the forces were entirely independent of the British command and logistics structure. Despite these separate structures, the units of the saison could coordinate at a lower level when necessary, though this was primarily to provide time-sensitive information regarding particular unfolding operations. In these cases, it is questionable whether the imperial forces involved recognized the joint nature of the saison units or simply acted on intelligence presented to them.

One of the hallmarks of all forms of cooperation between the Haganah and the Palestine Government was the dual nature of the organizational structures. This is perhaps one of the only consistent features of the various forms of cooperation among the structures set up for this purpose. The Haganah enjoyed varying levels of autonomy during the Second World War. However, it never entirely lost its autonomy. The structure of the relationship between the Palestine Government and the local forces of the Haganah thus resembled an alliance of two independent actors, rather than a hierarchical relationship between government and governed. It is worth noting that the autonomy of the Haganah when acting on the Empire’s behalf was a consistent feature of all cooperative structures established between the Haganah and imperial forces.

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69 Interview with Hayim Miller.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
Haganah-Army Cooperation

The British Army employed local forces in Palestine for three purposes: recruitment, skilled labour, and force augmentation (including guides and scouts). Each of these objectives required a different structure for its fulfilment. Only the third, however, the provision of guides and scouts to the army from the Haganah, constituted the employment of a local force, and thus comes under the brief of this paper.

As noted previously, individual Yishuv members could volunteer as scouts and guides to be embedded in regiments deployed to Palestine following the Arab Revolt of 1936. The 1941 Levantine campaign saw a need for a new type of scout familiar with the terrain across the border into Lebanon and Syria and not embedded in imperial units. These scouts guided imperial forces to the start line for the campaign and to initial objectives across the border, in some cases taking part in operations to secure these objectives. The Palmach (an elite branch of the Haganah) recruited the scouts under order from the Haganah. The basis of this order was a request for assistance by the imperial forces. The structure of the arrangement was such that the scouts came into the command structure as fully formed units, supplied by both British and Haganah logistics. This allowed the units latitude in their size, which in some cases reached up to three times the size authorized by imperial command. The scouting units of the Haganah then recruited irregular guides of their own from among Arab, Circassian, and Druse residents of the border regions. In this process, individual scouting units did not liaise with the imperial divisions. Instead, they operated under Haganah operations command in Haifa, which liaised with the overall imperial command. Once the campaign commenced, the Haganah units

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73 Interview with Hayim Kravi.
74 Interview with Uri Horowitz.
75 Interview with Uri Horowitz; Dayan, Story of my Life, p. 45.
76 Dayan, Story of my Life, pp. 45-6.
77 Dayan, Story of my Life, p. 46.
78 Ibid.
79 Dayan, Story of my Life, p. 47.
integrated with the divisional reconnaissance elements before demobilizing upon gaining the initial objectives.  

The Special Services

The SOE, Section D & the Haganah

By far the largest of the special service organizations in the Middle East were the SOE and its predecessors. The SOE also seems to have been one of the few to employ local forces as opposed to individual local agents. The first of the SOE’s precursors to make its presence felt was Section D, which on arrival in Palestine Mandate, in the winter of 1939-1940, immediately began to make arrangements with the Jewish Agency. The initial negotiations took place between senior field officers in Section D: Moshe Shertok, who served as the Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, and David HaCohen, director of Solel Boneh (the Yishuv’s national construction firm) and a senior figure in the Haganah.  

At the initial meeting, the parties agreed that all future policy decisions would be reached with equal input from Shertok, HaCohen, and the field commander for Palestine (D/H).  

In some ways, this set the tone for the structure that was to develop: the parties were separate, but roughly equal. The Haganah’s semi-clandestine nature and its previous experience with the Palestine Government’s policy changes determined much of the structure of the relationship between the Haganah and the Special Services. According to SOE records, the Jewish Agency did not want to work through official channels for fear of damaging their ‘political ambitions’.  

As a result, the initial design of the structure was that, in order to preserve the separation of Section D (later

80 Dayan, _Story of my Life_, p. 47; interview with Uri Horowitz.  
81 Draft letter from D/L to D/H 21.3.40 in HS3/201, UKNA.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Notes on activities in Palestine Autumn 1940 in HS3/207, UKNA.
SOE) and the Jewish Agency, liaison would only take place at senior levels. The memorandum of the first meeting set out the guiding principles of this arrangement:

the D/H organisation is to be regarded as an entirely separate entity from Friends (the Haganah) and while each is at liberty to make the maximum use of the corresponding organization, they should in principle be separate, particularly in order to protect the interests of Friends organization.

To maintain some form of plausible deniability, the structure was entirely secret, not just from the Palestine Government but also from the military. This compartmentalization caused a number of problems, culminating in the temporary withdrawal of the Section D mission in mid-1940.

Despite this general structure, the Special Services went to great lengths to ensure the Haganah received the cover of official sanction. This sanction took the form of a document that prevented the local authorities from interfering with any of the Haganah’s clandestine work for the Special Services. In practice, this gave the Haganah carte blanche to stockpile weapons and conduct training. Through this sanction and despite the best-intentioned agreements to the contrary, the Special Services and the Haganah were entwined.

Another result of these early negotiations was the establishment of the command and liaison structure, which remained largely unchanged throughout the course of the cooperation between the Haganah and Special Services. In these early days of cooperation, the command structure was self-contradictory. On the one hand, it preserved the principle of separation: liaison was only to take place at the highest levels and D would have no specific knowledge of the Haganah’s

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84 Ibid.
85 Memoranda Covering Subjects of discussion at meeting held at Haifa, July 13th, 1940 in File 80/563(2)/12, AHTA.
86 Letter from A.W. Lawrence to David, 31 in File 80/563(2)/11, AHTA.
87 Ibid.
88 Memoranda on a meeting in Haifa, July 13th, 1940 in File 80/563(2)/12, AHTA.
89 Ibid.
capabilities. Rather, the Haganah would suggest projects that were within its capabilities. On the other hand, when D received operational requirements from the army, it was to consider the Haganah’s capabilities.

The Haganah and the SOE established a joint planning structure which was to remain the cornerstone of all their future efforts. This structure consisted of David HaCohen representing the Haganah and a senior field officer from Section D/SOE. The SOE field commander in Palestine retained the ultimate authority to approve operations, but would delegate in most cases.

In 1940, the overall structure of the relationship manifested in two organizational structures, roughly definable as logistics and operations. The principle of separation was best maintained in the realm of logistics. Generally, supplies were procured by D and then delivered to the Haganah, which would maintain them in secret stores outside D’s control. The Haganah for its part kept records of the supplies and made both the supplies procured by D and those already held by the Haganah available for D’s use. At the same time, D established its own arms dumps, solely under British control, which were to be made available to the Haganah should the need arise. There was a similar arrangement regarding wireless stations. The arrangements led to some degree of awkwardness as they placed the SOE in the position of smuggling weapons and explosives into Mandatory Palestine for the use of an illegal, clandestine militant organization. This later became one of the key arguments employed by the Palestine Government in its attempt to disband the SOE in Palestine.

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Report from D/HP to A/D in HS3/201, UKNA.
97 Minutes of Meeting 29.7.1940 in File 80/563(ב)/11, AHTA.
98 Ibid.
The provision of supplies was not entirely one-sided; Section D and later the SOE found the Jewish Agency’s ability to manufacture explosives was both significant and relatively inexpensive.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, in the Middle East theatre, the Jewish Agency and the Haganah became the primary source for explosives purchased by the Special Services.\textsuperscript{100} Section D preserved the principle of separation as they paid for the delivery of the explosives from sources that were, at least in theory, legitimate manufacturers and not at all related to the Haganah.

The principle of separation became more muddled when it came to operational matters, especially training arrangements. The Haganah maintained autonomy in regional operations, within reason. By 1940, the SOE encouraged the Haganah to make exploratory arrangements in the Balkans, Iraq, Iran, and Syria ‘to establish whatever contacts they thought might be necessary for possible sabotage work, without getting involved in Arab politics’.\textsuperscript{101} For the purposes of training, there was a high level of integration, which increased throughout the war. However, in 1940 this was restricted to training courses in sabotage, with Section D providing instructors and legal protection and the Haganah providing personnel and facilities.\textsuperscript{102}

The general structure of the relationship between Special Services and the Haganah changed little throughout 1941. However, there was a marked structural change at the operational level. This was primarily due to the creation of the ‘Friends Scheme’, which existed partially because of the need to begin operations in the neighbouring Vichy-controlled territories. The early days of the ‘Friends Scheme’ expanded the training programmes created in 1940 and allowed imperial officers to serve directly in command of newly created Palmach units.\textsuperscript{103} Whether the officers were actually in command has proven impossible to verify. However, it is apparent that, at the

\textsuperscript{99} Memoranda on a meeting in Haifa, July 13\textsuperscript{th} 1940 in File 80/563(3)/12, AHTA.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Report from D/HP to A/D in HS3/201, UKNA.
\textsuperscript{102} Memoranda on a meeting in Haifa, July 13\textsuperscript{th} 1940 in File 80/563(3)/12, AHTA.
\textsuperscript{103} History of the SOE in The Arab World in HS7/86, UKNA.
very least, this scheme resulted in operational and tactical level liaison in addition to the previously existing command level liaison.

Despite this, the SOE and the Haganah preserved their separation in operations in the Vichy territories. In the operations to liberate Free French personnel in Vichy custody, the Jewish Agency acted independently, with only minimal oversight from the SOE.\(^{104}\) In this instance, the Jewish Agency was in charge of all active operations, logistics included.\(^{105}\) The SOE said as much in its report on the situation, stating that ‘it would appear that the whole matter, both of arranging payments [\textit{to bribe Vichy officials}] and for the active work involved were in the hands of Friends’.\(^{106}\) Furthermore, if the SOE required information on the progress or nature of the operations, it had to request it from the Jewish Agency, as there seems to have been no automatic liaison.\(^{107}\)

By 1942, the threat to Palestine’s territorial security was such that the integration of Special Services and the Haganah and, conversely, the ability of the Haganah to act autonomously, both increased. This manifested in several schemes, including the Friends Scheme and the Palestine Scheme. While the Friends Scheme and the special units of the Palchach came into being in 1941, they were more a feature of 1942. The Palestine Scheme, a continuation and expansion of the Friends Scheme with added demolition preparation elements, seems to have been a new development in 1942. However, in some respects, the cooperation’s general structure remained unchanged. For example, a specially appointed imperial officer continued to maintain the liaison, with David HaCohen as the primary upper level contact.\(^{108}\)

One of the evolutionary integrating changes of 1942 was in the logistical structures of the two organizations. According to Uri Horowitz, a Palchach member who first received training at the

\(^{104}\) Report on Escape of Free Frenchmen from Syria in HS3/210, UKNA.
\(^{105}\) Ibid.
\(^{106}\) Ibid.
\(^{107}\) Ibid.
\(^{108}\) Telegram from Cairo to ____ 10.6.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
Ben Shemen training facility, which was likely a part of the Friends Scheme, the Palmach received everything they needed, including weapons, materials, ammunition, explosives, and training instructors, from British Intelligence.109 From what Horowitz saw, a British colonel with whom the Palmach closely cooperated directed the supplies.110 This is particularly interesting as it contradicts the SOE’s initial plans for the logistics of the scheme, which guaranteed that its supplies would remain under imperial control.111

A crisis in early July 1942 provides an unusually clear illustration of the level of logistical and financial integration under the Palestine Scheme. The crisis came at a particularly dangerous time, when many generally believed that invasion would come within a matter of weeks and that the Palestine Scheme was the primary mechanism through which sabotage was to take place in preparation for the expected German onslaught.112 By July 1942, the monthly payment to the Jewish Agency for the resources of the Palestine Scheme was ‘considerably overdue’, and this was causing serious problems for the scheme.113 The SOE believed that without the payment, the organization created by the Haganah for sabotage and intelligence would fall apart and, further, the SOE’s ability to function in Palestine would be in jeopardy because it was fully reliant on the Haganah for personnel and on the Jewish Agency for supplies.114

The Palestine Scheme featured large-scale structural integration when it came to training. Initially, all Palmach units received training from the SOE.115 Later, in the Mishmar HaEmek camp, the units received training from Palmach instructors who had attended what seems to have been an SOE-run instructors’ course.116 The SOE still ran special courses such as explosives

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109 Interview with Uri Horowitz.
110 Ibid.
111 Extract from Note from Cairo sent 4.4.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
112 Telegram from Jerusalem to Cairo and London 12.07.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
113 Telegram from Cairo 11.7.1942 in HS3/207, Telegram from Jerusalem to Cairo and London 12.07.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
114 Telegram from Jerusalem to Cairo and London 12.07.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
115 Interview with Uri Horowitz.
116 Ibid.
course directly.\textsuperscript{117} SOE officers, at least in theory, were responsible not just for running the course but also for maintaining camp discipline.\textsuperscript{118} The SOE and the Haganah jointly wrote the syllabus at the training camps for both the Palestine Scheme and the Friends Scheme.\textsuperscript{119}

The SOE designed the operational structure of these schemes and the Haganah implemented it with relatively little interference from the imperial authorities. The SOE determined that the Palestine Scheme and Friends Scheme forces would operate in six small regional units around the country.\textsuperscript{120} The Palmach’s structure mirrored this with six regional companies located in roughly the same locations.\textsuperscript{121} Although, theoretically, the regional units were under the control of the SOE, Hebrew was the language of the financial records and reports from regional cells.\textsuperscript{122}

As the SOE in Palestine seems to have had few, if any, members with an advanced comprehension of Hebrew, this demonstrates that the SOE could exercise little oversight in practice.

As the immediate threat to Palestine receded, the SOE, among others, grew nervous of the autonomy allowed under these structures and tried to rein in their Haganah allies, and in 1943 all direct cooperation ceased.\textsuperscript{123} Nevertheless, the channels of communication and liaison established at the highest levels remained open, and relations between the two organizations remained positive.\textsuperscript{124}

The German Unit of the Palmach provides an additional well-documented illustration of the structure of the cooperation between the Haganah and the SOE on the levels of operations and training. In some ways, it was a microcosm of the whole picture. At least at first, both the

\textsuperscript{117} Telegram from Cairo to ____ 10.6.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Minutes from meeting held 14.11.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA.
\textsuperscript{120} Revised Palestine Scheme in HS3/207, UKNA.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.; Telegram from Cairo 28.9.1942 in HS3/207, UKNA; Situation Report for September 1942, From: Jerusalem To: Cairo and London, 6.10.42 in HS3/207, UKNA.
\textsuperscript{123} Memorandum on SOE activities in Arab Countries in HS7/85, UKNA.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
Haganah and British Intelligence provided logistics.\textsuperscript{125} The British provided weapons, explosives, and German uniforms for the unit.\textsuperscript{126} The unit’s training was a joint operation. They received training in close quarters combat and assassination from Hector Grant-Taylor, reputed to be one of the SOE’s better instructors in the subject.\textsuperscript{127} However, the best instructors of the Yishuv ran other weapons courses, explosives, sabotage, and naval courses.\textsuperscript{128} The Haganah also provided the facility to undertake the training while the SOE provided cover to allow it to operate without too much interference from the local authorities.\textsuperscript{129} Other than one review by a British intelligence officer, the Haganah was free to run the camp as it saw fit, under SOE cover.\textsuperscript{130}

The unit was one of the few cooperative units set up during this period to see any operational deployment. Several members deployed to infiltrate groups of POWs held in an imperial prison and gain intelligence.\textsuperscript{131} In this operation, the German Unit members functioned as an organic unit solely under imperial command.\textsuperscript{132}

When the SOE and the Haganah began to part ways towards the end of 1942, the unit continued for some time without SOE support.\textsuperscript{133} It cached arms and supplies in various ‘slics’ (underground arms dumps) and continued its training clandestinely.\textsuperscript{134} However, as pressure grew, British intelligence sought to bring the unit formally under imperial control.\textsuperscript{135} This the Haganah would not condone, and the German unit was eventually disbanded.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{125} Interview with Hayim Miller; interview with Avigdor Cohen.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Interview with Hayim Miller; interview with Avigdor Cohen; interview with Oreon Yoseph.
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Oreon Yoseph; interview with Hayim Miller.
\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Oreon Yoseph.
\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Hayim Miller.
\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Avigdor Cohen.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Hayim Miller.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Oreon Yoseph.
\textsuperscript{134} Interview with Oreon Yoseph; interview with Hayim Miller.
\textsuperscript{135} Interview with Hayim Miller; interview with Avigdor Cohen.
\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Hayim Miller; interview with Avigdor Cohen.
Conclusions

In Palestine, the structures of the relationships between the imperial authorities and the local organizations with which they cooperated partially determined the nature and employment of the local forces. The various structures had certain points of commonality and were affected by the long-term goals of the various actors. Thus, the Palestine Government’s wish to maintain its authority affected its relationships and as a result – with the exception of periods of emergency – led it to prefer a structure that attempted to minimize capabilities granted to local forces while maximizing these forces’ contribution. On the other hand, organizations such as the SOE focused more on the immediate war effort and thus were often more open to structures that allowed local forces to gain capabilities and maximize their operational effectiveness. However, in all cases the structures allowed the local forces a large degree of freedom of action. Moreover, the structures served the interests of both the imperial authorities and their local partners. Organizations such as the Haganah had agency and were able to fulfil their own goals of acquiring training and resources while at the same time providing tactical assets and manpower for the imperial authorities.

For the imperial authorities, the relationship structures also fulfilled political objectives. In the case of the JSP, the structure allowed the Palestine Government to claim authority where none existed. In the case of the SOE-Haganah relationship, the structure allowed the SOE to keep the Haganah officially at arm’s length while enjoying, in practical terms, very close collaboration. Yet under the pressure of two invasion scares, first with the threat from Syria and Lebanon in 1941 and subsequently with the German advance in Egypt in 1942, these political goals became secondary to military necessity and structures changed to take fullest advantage of the contributions local forces could make. The imperial authorities granted the local forces more autonomy and allocated them more resources and support. During these times of crisis,
structures primarily reflected the concern about invasion and the design was such as to ensure that local forces could contribute as best suited their capabilities.

Throughout the war, the structures took into account the fact that the local forces were best suited not to a conventional combat role but rather to roles such as scouting, which took advantage of their region-specific knowledge. The structure of the *saison de chasse* also utilized this knowledge and was similarly based around granting local forces autonomy and freedom of action. In short, the structures of the relationships were designed to best serve the interests of both the imperial authorities and the Haganah and to optimize the local forces’ role in the overall imperial order of battle and regional defence. Only objections within the imperial government to the employment of the forces, and the imperial authorities’ occasional need to present an outward veneer of either control or distance in relation to their local partners, tempered this function.
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Interview with Avraham Akavia
Interview with Avraham Rabinov
Interview with Avraham Silverstein
Interview with Hayim Kravi
Interview with Oreon Yoseph
Interview with Shlomo Tivishi
Interview with Uri Horowitz
Interview with Yehuda Lapidot
Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon
Interview with Yonah Hatzor

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